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We got an array overflow in enumerated lists nested more than
10 deep with start number =/= 1.
Found by google/oss-fuzz.
https://oss-fuzz.com/v2/testcase-detail/5546760854306816
This commit also ensures that we don't try to set `enum_` counters
that aren't defined by LaTeX (generally up to enumv).
Closes #210.
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echo '[](xx:)' | ./build/src/cmark -t latex
Segmentation fault: 11
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* Don't double-output the link in latex-rendering.
* Prevent ligatures in dashes sensibly when rendering latex.
\- is a hyphenation, so it doesn't get displayed at all.
* Redo "Don't double-output the link in latex-rendering."
This reverts commit 8fb1f1c3c8799628141780ca5fd8d70883c1ec53
and adds the proper solution to the problem.
With commit 8fb1f1c3c double rendering is fixed, but the url isn't
escaped anymore, so I discarded the wrong copy.
We now return 0 from the function in case of a single link,
which stops processing the contents of the node.
* Add a comment about the double-rendering issue addressed in 1c0d4749451cf85a849a3cf8e41cf137789821d4
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The previous work for unbounded memory usage and overflows on the buffer
API had several shortcomings:
1. The total size of the buffer was limited by arbitrarily small
precision on the storage type for buffer indexes (typedef'd as
`bufsize_t`). This is not a good design pattern in secure applications,
particualarly since it requires the addition of helper functions to cast
to/from the native `size` types and the custom type for the buffer, and
check for overflows.
2. The library was calling `abort` on overflow and memory allocation
failures. This is not a good practice for production libraries, since it
turns a potential RCE into a trivial, guaranteed DoS to the whole
application that is linked against the library. It defeats the whole
point of performing overflow or allocation checks when the checks will
crash the library and the enclosing program anyway.
3. The default size limits for buffers were essentially unbounded
(capped to the precision of the storage type) and could lead to DoS
attacks by simple memory exhaustion (particularly critical in 32-bit
platforms). This is not a good practice for a library that handles
arbitrary user input.
Hence, this patchset provides slight (but in my opinion critical)
improvements on this area, copying some of the patterns we've used in
the past for high throughput, security sensitive Markdown parsers:
1. The storage type for buffer sizes is now platform native (`ssize_t`).
Ideally, this would be a `size_t`, but several parts of the code expect
buffer indexes to be possibly negative. Either way, switching to a
`size` type is an strict improvement, particularly in 64-bit platforms.
All the helpers that assured that values cannot escape the `size` range
have been removed, since they are superfluous.
2. The overflow checks have been removed. Instead, the maximum size for
a buffer has been set to a safe value for production usage (32mb) that
can be proven not to overflow in practice. Users that need to parse
particularly large Markdown documents can increase this value. A static,
compile-time check has been added to ensure that the maximum buffer size
cannot overflow on any growth operations.
3. The library no longer aborts on buffer overflow. The CMark library
now follows the convention of other Markdown implementations (such as
Hoedown and Sundown) and silently handles buffer overflows and
allocation failures by dropping data from the buffer. The result is
that pathological Markdown documents that try to exploit the library
will instead generate truncated (but valid, and safe) outputs.
All tests after these small refactorings have been verified to pass.
---
NOTE: Regarding 32 bit overflows, generating test cases that crash the
library is trivial (any input document larger than 2gb will crash
CMark), but most Python implementations have issues with large strings
to begin with, so a test case cannot be added to the pathological tests
suite, since it's written in Python.
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- Implement cmark_isalpha.
- Check for ASCII character before implicit cast to char.
- Use internal ctype functions in commonmark.c.
Fixes test failures on Windows and undefined behavior.
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This is an alternate solution for pull request #132,
which introduced a new warning on the comparison:
latex.c:191:20: warning: comparison of integers of
different signs: 'size_t' (aka 'unsigned long') and 'bufsize_t'
(aka 'int') [-Wsign-compare]
if (realurllen == link_text->as.literal.len &&
~~~~~~~~~~ ^ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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- Extend CMARK_OPT_NOBREAKS to all renderers and add `--nobreaks`.
- Do not autowrap, regardless of width parameter, if CMARK_OPT_NOBREAKS
is set.
- Fixed CMARK_OPT_HARDBREAKS for LaTeX and man renderers.
- Ensure that no auto-wrapping occurs if CMARK_OPT_NOBREAKS is enabled,
or if output is CommonMark and CMARK_OPT_HARDBREAKS is enabled.
- Updated man pages.
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They're not supported by MSVC.
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Newer MSVC versions support enough of C99 to be able to compile cmark
in plain C mode. Only the "inline" keyword is still unsupported.
We have to use "__inline" instead.
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API change. Sorry, but this is the time to break things,
before 1.0 is released. This matches the recent changes to
CommonMark.dtd.
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Now we render `[foo](#bar)` as `\protect\hyperlink{bar}{foo}`.
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CMARK_NODE_HRULE -> CMARK_NODE_THEMATIC_BREAK.
However we've defined the former as the latter to keep
backwards compatibility.
See jgm/CommonMark 8fa94cb460f5e516b0e57adca33f50a669d51f6c
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Defined CMARK_NODE_HEADER to CMARK_NODE_HEADING to ease
the transition.
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See jgm/CommonMark commit 0cdbcee4e840abd0ac7db93797b2b75ca4104314
Note that we have defined
cmark_node_get_header_level = cmark_node_get_heading_level
and
cmark_node_set_header_level = camrk_node_set_heading_level
for backwards compatibility in the API.
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Instead of using their `as.literal` content, we now
give each custom node *two* literal fields, one to
be printed on entering the node (before rendering
the children, if any), the other on exiting (after
rendering children).
This gives us the flexibility to have custom nodes
with children.
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These are passed through verbatim by all writers, with no
escaping.
They are never generated by the parser, and do not correspond
to CommonMark elements. They are designed to be inserted by
filters that postprocess the AST. For example, a filter might
convert specially marked code blocks to svg diagrams in HTML
and tikz diagrams in LaTeX, passing these through to the renderer
as a RAW_BLOCK.
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* Reformatted all source files.
* Added 'format' target to Makefile.
* Removed 'astyle' target.
* Updated .editorconfig.
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Moved begin_line setting into render.c, so you don't need to
worry about it in outc.
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Added options argument to render_node function, and rearrange
argument order.
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Now we just calculate this in the latex renderer.
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Also removed unneeded function.
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This allows us to remove direct manipulation of buffer from
the latex and commonmark renderers.
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* Added functions for cr, blankline, out to renderer object.
* Removed lit (we'll handle this with a macro).
* Changed type of out so it takes a regular string instead of
a chunk.
* Use macros LIT, OUT, BLANKLINE, CR in renderers to simplify code.
(Not sure about this, but `renderer->out(renderer, ...)` sure is
verbose.)
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* Added render.c, render.h.
* Moved common functions and definitions from latex.c and commonmark.c
to render.c, render.h.
* Added a wrapper, cmark_render, that creates a renderer given a
character-escaper and a node renderer.
Closes #63.
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A rendered int can't be 20 digits.
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Added comments about required packages.
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* New exported function in API: `cmark_render_latex`.
* Added src/latex.hs.
* Updated README and man page.
* Closes #31.
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